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Abstract—We investigated the characteristics and motives of 
Italian voluntary delisting observing a period of eleven years, 
2001 to 2011. The final sample is made up of 53 industrial 
companies, compared with a control sample of 106 companies 
still listed in the period. Main goal is to assess if any signals can 
predict a delisting operation for listed companies in Italy and if 
Italian market shows differences with previous investigation in 
Continental Europe and US.  
Practical implications of results achieved can help to highlight 
on Public to Private phenomenon in Italy, still not enough 
observed considering the high number of delisted companies in 
the last decade relating to a relative small number of listed 
companies 
 
Index Terms— Free Cash Flow, Dividend, Going Private, 
Delisting, BOSO, Governance 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Due to financial crisis started in 2008 the delisting process 
has gained new interest from academic and professional 
environment. The number of firms going private is increasing 
in the current decade at relevant rate worldwide, this 
representing a first reason for a new wave of attention in 
corporate finance literature to this phenomenon, not much 
explored comparing with discussion on going public.  
The phenomenon of delisting, also known as Public to 
Private transaction (here and after PtP) assumes a particular 
relevance in Italy compared to the major European countries 
in term of both the total number of delisting and the smaller 
number of listed company, even if Italian market is quite 
different looking at other comparable contests considering 
corporate governance characteristics of listed company (i.e., 
the ownership structure and the high presence of financial 
institution in the capital market). 
Delisting operation can be realized through different type of 
transactions. According to [1] it is possible to distinguish 
between Involuntary delisting, , when a firm has been 
merged/acquired by another firm or experience financial 
distress, and Voluntary delisting (known as well as Regular 
delisting, or Going private transactions), when a listed firm 
voluntary revoke his listed status.  
Causes for involuntary delisting are generally linked to 
corporate restructuring such as financial distress of the firm, 
operation of merger or acquisition by other firm, change of 
corporate form, integration into parent company, reverse stock 
split, share repurchases where resulting company no longer 
meets the listing requirements or prerequisites of the exchange  
 
 
[2], [3]. These cases are also known as cold delisting. 
In the contrast, a voluntary delisting is experienced by a 
listed company asking for complete revocation of its listing 
admission, or when the revocation of the listing admission is 
caused ex officio for non-compliance of issuing requirements. 
When existing investors or controlling investors (such as 
private equity fund, family owner or historical owner) decide 
to go private through a Buy-out, voluntary delisting has been 
defined with the acronym BOSO, Buy-out Offer with Squeeze 
Out [4]. Two types of BOSO can be distinguished [5]: first, 
the squeeze-out is the first following operation after an 
acquisition by new owners; second, the historic shareholder, 
such as the family owner or the corporate owner, increases its 
control in order to have more power of squeeze out minority 
investors. So that, just voluntary delisting can be considered a 
Public to Private transaction in a proper way (here and after 
PtP). 
The rational, the framework regulation and form of all the 
mentioned practices of going private differs substantially, 
requiring to isolate one type of transaction from one another.  
This contribute focuses on regular delisting and it is 
organized as follows.  
In the first section we provide a review of the main 
literature on delisting operations. We than define the 
hypotheses tested in our empirical analysis, the research 
design and the main characteristics of sample observed. 
Finally, we provide main findings, the limits of the analysis 
and suggestions for further research.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ON DELISTING 
A wide range of topics on delisting practice have been 
investigate, focusing on different incentives for going private, 
basically ranked in three main stream: 
1. Traditional incentives related; 
2. Agency theory; 
3. Financial structure. 
Some authors investigated on probability to go private 
searching for “traditional motivation”, related to increasing in 
listing costs and/or decrease in listing benefits. 
[6] tested for size hypothesis and probability to go private, 
stating that, as larger firms are potentially more efficient at 
amortizing fixed listing costs, small firms would be more 
motivated to leave the public market when the direct costs of 
being listed increase. Moreover, authors provide test for 
undervaluation hypothesis, considered as an example of an 
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opportunity cost that is generated by asymmetric information 
between managers/owners and stock market investors. Unlike 
investors, management has superior inside information and 
knows the true distribution of future returns. Therefore, 
undervaluation occurs when the market price of the share does 
not fully reflect the true value of the firm. Following the path, 
when the management knows that the share price is 
undervalued, they may decide to go private to extract private 
benefits and to avoid the opportunity costs of staying listed 
[7].  
Considering reduction in listing benefits, [8] tested for 
reduction of ability to share risk with public investors. 
Observing deteriorating of ability to share risk with public 
investors, they found that, when a controlling shareholder has 
more complete information about expected return of a firm’s 
assets, public status is attractive because risk can be more 
efficiently shared with public investors, those eliminating 
idiosyncratic risk maintaining well-diversified portfolios. In 
opposition, a firm prefers to go private when specific risk 
(idiosyncratic risk) is low and being listed does not provide 
risk-sharing advantage.  
Secondly, [9] tested for decrease in listing benefits in terms 
of reduction of financial visibility. Since market analysts can 
affect a firm in a number of ways, a negative relationship is 
assumed between the degree of financial visibility and the 
decision to go private. So that, firms with decreases in analyst 
coverage, institutional ownership and turnover (i.e. volume of 
transactions) were more likely to go private.  
In line with the issue, different authors investigate on 
reduction of liquidity of the stock and probability to go 
private. Major findings shows that, since liquidity of share 
trading is a primary benefit of going public, if the stocks’ 
liquidity benefit deteriorates, the firm will be more likely to go 
private [10, 11, 12]. 
A second stream of authors focused on incentives to 
delisting operations derived from the agency theory. In 
particular, in Anglo Saxon countries, characterized by a 
central dilemma on “how to get the manager to act in the best 
interest of the shareholders” [13], two main hypothesis have 
been tested to provide possible explanations for a delisting via 
an LBO (primary way of delisting in US and UK).  
First, free cash flow hypothesis has been linked to high 
leverage associated with an LBO, which is supposed to reduce 
the waste of FCFs by the managers because more cash-flow is 
needed to repay the debt. 
Secondly, incentive realignment hypothesis, considered as 
an important factor in going private operation. Delisting 
operation, that provide a higher concentration in share capital 
as a consequences of share buy-back, allows to boost 
shareholder’s wealth providing rewards for the managers, 
inducing them to act consistently with the interests of 
investors [14, 15]. 
In Continental Europe, where ownership structure is more 
concentrated, almost showing a situation where largest 
shareholder’s stake is approximately twice as large as that in 
Anglo-Saxon LBO targets [16], motivation of going dark are 
closely related to monitoring role and conflicts of interest 
between large and minority shareholders.  
[17], observing firm’s attractiveness for private equity 
investors, stated that it depends on the quality of the 
monitoring by the large shareholder: a highly monitored firm 
is likely to be less attractive to private equity investors 
because the potential for value creation will be lower. 
Conversely, in a lowly monitored firm, the large shareholder 
will be more tempted to sell the firm via an LBO. 
Observing sample of PtP in UK, [18] and [19] stated that 
the presence of a stronger concentration of ownership implies 
closer monitoring by outside shareholders prior to the GPT. 
Thus, the firm is less likely to suffer from high agency costs 
stemming from conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
managers. So that, if the realignment hypothesis is considered 
to be an explanation for European GPTs, realignment is not as 
strong a driving factor as it is in the Anglo-Saxon markets. 
On the other side of the moon, if high concentration smooth 
probability to suffer of weak monitoring, large shareholders 
are likely to extract private benefits of control. [20] observed 
that large shareholders, in particular in the case of ownership 
concentration in a single family, might be tempted to extract 
private benefits of control where minority investors are not in 
a strong bargaining position.  
[5] stated that the incentives of the controlling shareholder 
for delisting the firm can differ according to its identity. In 
particular, family owners aim to maximize their benefits, 
including often private benefits not available to minority 
investors. Moreover, families are often risk-averse [21]. They 
will choose to exit the public market when facing threats to 
their control, as can be the case for smaller and undervalued 
firms, which are ideal acquisition targets. In this situation, 
family controlling shareholders may decide to close the capital 
of their firm to avoid a contest with minority shareholders who 
could sell their shares to a new owner, such as an institutional 
investor [5]. In synthesis, the control hypothesis is proposed as 
an alternative hypothesis for European PtPs via an LBO. This 
hypothesis posits an inverse relationship between the 
shareholder’s wealth gains from PtPs and the ownership 
concentration [17]. 
The third main issue investigated by authors is related to 
motivations to go private and financial structure. Because of 
different use of leverage, with implications linked to tax 
benefits of debt financing in going private operation, 
hypotheses related to the financial structure of the delisted 
firm will differ strongly according to the type of PtP. Tax 
benefit linked to high leverage is presented in many studies as 
a key driving factor in the decision to go private via an LBO.  
Using a sample of US going dark operation, [22] observed 
that tax benefits is a significant source of wealth gains because 
of tax deductibility of interest payments on corporate debt. 
The substantial increase in cash-flows creates a major tax 
shield and, after the transaction, firms pay almost no tax for a 
long period, which increases the shareholders’ gains. This 
result has been recently confirmed for LBO operation, 
underlining that magnitude of tax benefit depends on the fiscal 
regime and the marginal tax rate the firm is subjected to [23]. 
Over LBO, literature on delisting observed delisting via 
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Buyout Squeeze Out Operation (BOSO), another way to go 
private. BOSO transaction does not require financial leverage 
as in LBOs operation that follow the acquisition of the firm by 
private equity investors. In the case of a voluntary BOSO, the 
first player for delisting is usually the historic controlling 
shareholder, a corporation or a family owner. As a 
consequence, the driving factors behind the delisting decision 
via a BOSO are likely to be different than for a delisting due 
to LBOs, M&As or financial distress [5].  
Using financial distress model of [24] that consider 
hypothesis related to size, age, portfolio diversification and 
growth opportunities to analyze a paired sample of UK 
companies, [18] stated that decision to go private is a trade-off 
between the potential gains from incentive realignment and 
the possible costs of financial distress, showing that delisted 
firms are smaller, younger, more diversified and with a lower 
growth opportunities, measured by the Q ratios. 
Focusing on leverage and growth opportunities hypothesis, 
previous results have been confirmed. Recent contributions of 
[25] and [5] underline that if the firm no longer needs access 
to the equity market and is not financially constrained, the 
decision to go private could reveal its preference for 
alternative sources of financing such as debt, given that there 
are fewer benefits – and many costs – associated with being 
listed. Furthermore, if the firm no longer needs access to the 
equity market, another motivation for a delisting could be a 
lack of growth opportunities and investment projects. 
In synthesis, the phenomenon of delisting assumed 
relatively big dimension in last decade because of changing in 
financial markets and regulatory law framework for listed 
companies. Because of a short number of studies have been 
produced on the “under the eye” market in term of volatility of 
stock price, such as the Italian market in the last year, that can 
contribute to boost delisting, this investigation is focused on 
testing some driving factors such as and probability to go 
private. 
III. RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
We decide to concentrate our attention only on a limited 
number of hypotheses derived from literature that can better fit 
Italian delisting operations of a sample of industrial listed 
firms. In order to test the hypotheses we define key variables 
based on both capital markets data and financial statement 
information.  
The set of hypothesis derived from the literature, the 
definition of each hypothesis through a set of variables and 
related formulas, the assumed relationship between the value 







TABLE I.  -SUMMARY OF THE HYPOTHESES 
 
In particular, according with previous investigations of [22, 
23, 24, 26, 27], we assume that the amount of free cash flow in 
a company should positively influence the probability of a 
delisting operation. This occurs this form of suboptimal 
allocation of capital can be assumed an agency costs proxy 
since any excess cash should be disbursed to shareholders. 
Furthermore, this creates an incentive especially for BOSO 
and LBO operation.  
The second set of hypotheses is focused on capital 
structure. First of all, low leveraged companies can be 
considered as a target in LBO operation, since it allows an 
additional value creation potential for new shareholders by 
means of their capital structure. Secondly, a higher leverage, 
which can be considered as a proxy for control on 
performance by the management, permits to put under 
pressure the management in the use of cash limiting their 
scope for discretionary spending, this increasing the risk of 
imminent job losses if performance is poor. 
Decreasing benefits of listing hypotheses are based on the 
corporate Life Cycle Stage Theory [28]. It is assumed that 
mature companies marked by slow growth can be easily 
financed by internal capital generation or low cost debt 
sourced outside. Furthermore they may benefit for an easier 
assets assessment which can be used as security for debt 
financing, this reducing funding costs. So that, we assume a 
negative relation between the probability of a delisting 
operation and all selected variables representative of a stable 
growth.  
Set of hypotheses 4 refers to the firm’s undervaluation. The 
valuation discrepancies can be due to information asymmetries 
between insiders and outsiders regarding the company’s future 
profitability and productivity; if this occurs, insiders could 
benefit in set up share buy-back programs [22, 29]. 
Furthermore, in case of undervaluation, a limited market 
capitalization - which has adverse effect on secondary market 
liquidity - increases the internal (owners and management) 
and external investors’ incentives to take firm private to get 





Cash Flow CF EBITDAt-1/BVt-1
Liquidity LIQUI NWCt-1/TAt-1
Tobin Q PROXYQ (Market Cap + Debt)t-1/Total Asset(t-1)
Free Cash Flow FCF (EBITDA-Net tax Expense-Dividends Paid)t-
1/Equityt-1
Leverage LEVERAGE Netl Debt(t-1)/Total Asset(t-1)
Variance 
in EBIT
VARIA (Standard Deviation of EBIT (t-1 to t-3)/Mean of 
EBIIT (t-1 to t-3)
Tax Paid TAX Tax Paid(t-1)/BV_Equity(t-1) Positive
Sales Growth 
Rate
SALEGR (Sales t-3 /Sales t-1)-1
Employment 
Growth Rate
EMPLOYGR (Employment t-3 / Employment t-1)-1
Shareholder 
Profitability
ROE Earnings(t-1) / BV of Equity(t-1)
Equity EQUITY Book value of Equity(t-1)
Total Asset ASSETS Book value of Asset(t-1)
EBITDA Margin MARGIN EBITDA(t-1)/ Sales(t-1)
Market to Book 
Ratio
PxBV Market capitalisation (t-1)/ Equity, per share(t-1)
Sale Multiple PxSALES Share Market Price at fiscal year end/ Sales(t-1)
Market 
Capitalisation
MKTCAP Number of outstanding shares x Share price at 
fiscal year end




DPS Total Dividend paid(t-1) * Number of 
Outstanding Share (t-1)
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the potential value. This effect can be particularly relevant for 
Italian market since the major part of listed companies are 
basically highly concentrated in ownership, often owned by 
founder’s family [30]. 
Our last set of hypotheses (H5) is strictly related with the 
perception of delisting operation as rather stable companies 
that tend to operate in mature industries. According to [31], 
eligible firms for delisting are expected to pay relatively 
higher dividends because of a low need of investments. This 
argument is also consistent with hypothesis 2 (Leverage 
potential) since it is assumed that PtP firms are less engaged in 
debt repayment: lower debt commitment can be traduced in 
low dividends retained. Moreover, the dividend policy can be 
considered as a signal of conflicting interest between 
shareholders and management: while shareholders have a 
strong interest in dividend payments, the management wants 
to keep financial resources within the company to boost 
investment plan [27]. In this context, going dark permits to 
reduce conflict between ownership and control reducing 
pressure on short term profits and dividends in favor of long 
term strategies. 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION 
The sample is made of 53 going private firms, which 
constitute 55% of the total of the industrial companies delisted 
in the period 2001-2011, and the 87% of the total voluntary 
delisting - experienced by a listed company when a company 
voluntary moves to go dark asking for complete revocation of 
its listing admission, or when the revocation of the listing 
admission is caused ex officio for non-compliance of issuing 
requirements - in the same period considering the whole 
industrial sectors. 
For the data collection we had to turn in different data 
sources to construct our sample. We mainly used Bloomberg 
database. In case Bloomberg missed data, data have been 
provided by Centro Studi Mediobanca. Moreover, we used 
public information provided by Borsa Italiana and Consob, the 
main regulatory institution in Italian financial markets. 
In order to analyze the characteristic of the PtP sample with 
the support of univariate and multivariate analysis, we select a 
control group of listed company using the paired sample 
design approach (following Michelsen and Klein approach). In 
particular the criteria of selection of the control group are 
industry background and size [32, 33], minimizing any sector 
or size effect in our analysis. 
The sample investigated and the control sample are ranked 







TABLE II.  - INDUSTRY DISTRIBUTION AND BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We decide to estimate a logit model by maximum-
likelihood comparable to the one employed in previous studies 
[18, 22, 26]. 
The dependent variable is equal to “zero” if the company 
remains public over the sampling period and “one” if the 
company goes private. We have estimated different model 
specification. The first model allows us to test all set of 
postulated hypothesis. The other models vary in respect of the 
inclusion of the variables in order to looking for models with 
the highest overall significance. Table 3 shows results for 
Model 1 and Model 6. 









Industrial Goods & Services 31 16 47
Personal & Household Goods 24 8 32
Construction & Materials 10 4 14
Technology 6 4 10
Utilities 6 3 9
Travel & Leisure 5 3 8
Chemicals 4 3 7
Real Estate 4 2 6
Automobiles & Parts 4 2 6
Health Care 3 2 5
Retail 2 2 4
Telecommunications 2 1 3
Media 3 0 3
Basic Resources 1 1 2
Oil & Gas 1 0 1
Food & Beverage 0 1 1
Financial Services 0 1 1
Samples 106 53 159
Key variables Variables
β SE β SE
Constant Constant -0,2976 0,4947 0,3910 *** 0,0461
Cash Flow CF 1,7520 1,0960 0,0987 * 0,0386
Liquidity LIQUI 0,7127 1,0260
Tobin Q PROXYQ -0,3884 0,4152
Free Cash Flow FCF -0,1746 0,2051
Leverage LEVERAGE -0,0018 0,0020
Variance in EBIT VARIA -0,0530 0,0646
Tax Paid TAX -3,5900 2,8520
Sales Growth Rate SALEGR 0,8418 * 0,0456 0,0657 * 0,0297
Employment Growth Rate EMPLOYGR -1,2620 * 0,5568 -0,1404 * 0,0628
Shareholder Profitability ROE 0,0032 0,0112
Equity EQUITY 0,0000 0,0000
Total Asset ASSETS 0,0000 0,0000
EBITDA Margin MARGIN 0,0123 0,0121
Market to Book Ratio PxBV 0,0665 0,1935
Sale Multiple PxSALES 0,0071 0,0155
Market Capitalisation MKTCAP 0,0000 0,0000
Dividend Yield DIVY -0,3082 * 0,1759 -0,0551 ** 0,0178
Dividend per Share DPS -0,9918 1,6610
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In a multivariate context the statistical significance of the 
variables in our univariate analysis changes partially. The 
Model 1 allows us to test all our postulated hypotheses and 
shows that a greater sales growth, a lower employment growth 
and a lower dividend yield have positive effect on the PtP 
probability. Excluding progressively explanatory variables 
which proved not significant in the univariate analysis and 
those revealing multicollinearity, we tried to improve the 
overall goodness-of-fit of the logit model. Nevertheless, it 
shows just few differences among model specifications and in 
results achieved in previous reported Wilcoxon test analysis.  
The free cash flow variable’s parameters show differences 
in results. Cash flow variable and liquidity are significant 
regarding the probability of going private and with the 
assumed sign. On the contrary, free cash variable with the 
Tobin’s Q measures show no significant influence in PtP 
transaction and furthermore have the opposite sign. So that, 
we have to partially dismiss the free cash flow hypothesis 
(H1), as found in previous results conducted by [34] and [26]. 
Considering our assumption, and in line with univariate 
analysis, leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) shows opposite sign 
and no significance in explanatory models. Nevertheless, the 
found sign is consistent with free cash flow variable (FCF), 
this assuming same sign in the relation. This underlines that 
this firms have not to be considered as attractive for external 
take over (namely in the form of LBO). In contrast to US 
research, the taxes paid (TAX) by the target firm prior to the 
PtP transaction are not related to the wealth effects the deal is 
expected to generate. Although leverage potential hypothesis 
are consistent with free cash flow variables, we have to reject 
H2. 
Regarding hypothesis of stock market quotation decreasing 
benefits very few variables show the right signs of coefficients 
(ASSET, EMPLOYGR). Only SALEGR and EMPLOYGR 
can be considered as explanatory variables of the probability 
to going private; as recorded in the univariate analysis, 
SALESGR show significance and a positive relation to PtP. 
So that we have to refuse H3 as formulated in life cycle 
theory. 
We have also to dismiss the hypothesis on limited capital 
market efficiency (H4) since results of multivariate analysis 
do not show systematic undervaluation of going private firms. 
Finally, the assumptions by H5 - regarding delisting 
operation paying higher payout in the form of dividends - 
cannot be confirmed. In fact, the variables selected to 
demonstrate the hypothesis have a negative relation with the 
probability to delist and only the dividend yield is significant. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The aim of this study was to examine the characteristics of 
delisting operations in Italy and the drivers of such 
transaction. For this purpose, we analyzed a hand-collected 
sample of 53 companies for the period 2001-2011 with the 
help of univariate and multivariate test statistics.  
The following table provides an overview of the main 
findings of our studies. 
TABLE IV.  SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
N.S. = Not Significant 
Our findings show that Italian going private’s firms are 
relatively small in size and operating in mature sectors with a 
slow growth expressed in terms employment growth rate. 
Furthermore, delisted firms are marked by a high capital needs 
since they show higher leverage comparing with control 
sample. 
Our results differ consistently from previous investigation 
conducted mainly in Anglo-Saxon markets (US, UK) and 
secondly in Continental Europe markets. In fact, we did not 
find any significance in major hypothesis tested by main 
literature on the topic, this allowing us to affirm that Italian 
firms has been boosted by different incentives to go private. In 
particular, considering free cash flow hypothesis linked to 
Agency Theory [35], our results do not confirm a positive 
relation between excess annual cash flow and going private 
operation. Moreover, hypothesis on leverage potential are less 
consistent for Italian experience. The Italian sample is also 
marked by a low profitability and a policy of retaining 
earnings.  
We can conclude as follows. Initiators of the public to 
private transaction are not driven by taking advantage in using 
unused liquidity ex-post or in boosting leverage through LBO 
or gain from an acquisition of a supposed undervalued listed 
firm. On the contrary, since we don’t prove undervaluation 
hypothesis - that allows to affirm that a going dark decision 
can be assumed to avoid hostile takeover by competitors – our 
evidence supports that a going private decision has to be 
interpreted as a need of public companies to refine capital 
structure and business portfolio. 
An interesting research route for further research in Italian 
context can be addressed in searching for (i) any relation 
between type of investors and ownership structure ex-ante and 
ex-post delisting operation to support this interpretation of 
results achieved (ii) the influence of trading volume and 










Cash Flow N.S. Positive
Liquidity N.S. N.S.
Tobin Q Negative N.S.
Free Cash Flow Positive N.S.
Leverage N.S N.S.
Variance in EBIT N.S N.S.
Tax Paid Positive N.S Negative
Sales Growth Rate Positive Positive
Employment Growth Rate Negative Negative
Shareholder Profitability N.S N.S.
Equity N.S N.S.
Total Asset N.S N.S.
EBITDA Margin N.S N.S.
Market to Book Ratio N.S N.S.
Sale Multiple N.S N.S.
Market Capitalisation N.S N.S.
Dividend Yield N.S Negative
Dividend per Share Negative N.S
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